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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to locate the dominant discourse on organizations and their 
management in the history of Western thought. Such location highlights the fundamental, taken-
for-granted assumptions underlying the dominant discourse. The purpose is also to identify an 
alternative way of thinking about organizations which derives from different fundamental 
assumptions. The approach adopted in the paper is to review two fundamentally different 
approaches in Western thought to understanding the nature of the individual human agent, the 
organization and the relationship between them. One approach derives from the philosophy of 
Kant and the other from Hegel. The exploration of different ways of thinking in this paper leads 
to a major undermining of the dominant discourse and overturns the most widespread 
prescriptions for strategic management and the management of change. In dong so it has 
profound significance for the conceptualization of leadership and values in organizations. 
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It is illuminating, I think, to place today’s dominant discourse on the practices of day to day 
management in organizations in the context of the development of Western thought. What this 
illuminates is the taken-for granted assumptions underlying that discourse.  Perhaps the most 
fundamental of these assumptions has to do with the particular notions of the individual self as 
agent, the organization, and the relationship between them. Consider briefly how these notions 
have changed over hundreds of years in the West. 
 
 
The modernist position: the autonomous individual 
 
In the Middle Ages there was no notion of an individual subject as a self, as an autonomous 
agent, in the modern sense. Instead, the subject was defined in relation to a cosmic order so that 
persons come most fully to themselves when they are in touch with that cosmic order, in union 
with God and knowledge takes the form of the exegesis of God’s revelation. Individual identity 
was related to one’s position or role within the social hierarchy. The individual subject was thus 
defined by external authority in relation to an external world and the group or society consisted 
simply of a given hierarchical order. This notion of individual and society changed dramatically 
over the roughly three-hundred-year period of the scientific revolution, culminating in the 
modern notion of the self which was most clearly formulated by the Enlightenment philosophers. 
By that time, everything about the external world, including God, was open to doubt but one 
thing was not and that, according to Descartes, was the existence of the individual, doubting self. 
The subject was no longer defined in relation to external authority but, rather, defined itself. 
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Instead of immersion in the external world, self consciousness was understood to require 
withdrawal from the objective world through individual, internal processes of observation and 
thought. This modern self, now understood, following Leibniz, as a monad cut off from others, is 
aware of itself, defines itself, through processes of introspection and reason. This implies an 
atomistic view of society consisting of a collection of autonomous, rational individuals. To know 
is first to form rational hypotheses about an objective reality on the basis of reductive, 
mechanistic, linear, efficient causality of the ‘if-then’ kind, for example, if you double the force 
applied to an object in a vacuum then it will move twice as far.  To know, is secondly, to test the 
hypotheses against an objective reality. This is a conception of the individual mind as split off 
from the body, thinking split off from emotion, and of individuals as split off from each other, 
society and the natural world and it goes hand in hand with the objectification and control of both 
nature and society. The natural and social worlds, as objects of control, confirm man’s self-
defining identity and agency. This is the modernist world view. 
 
The German philosopher, Kant (1790), most powerfully articulated this modernist concept of the 
subject in claiming that humans were autonomous individuals in that each individual has the 
capacity, through innate powers of reason, to choose for himself his own objectives and devise 
his own plans to realize them. Change in a person then becomes a rational re-ordering of 
individual thought processes carried out by the autonomous moral individual. Implicit in this 
view is a completely different notion of causality to that applied to nature, namely, a rationalist 
causality. It is then a short stop to believe that not only can individuals change and control 
themselves by design but that they can also change societies and control nature in the same way.  
The cause of any change is the rational effort of the autonomous moral individual. Kant also 
argued that when it came to understanding inanimate matter, the mechanistic ‘if-the’ causality 
yielded powerful hypotheses but another approach was required to understand organisms in 
nature. He suggested that it would be more useful to think of organisms as if they were systems – 
the ‘as if’ is important because he argued that we can never know reality in itself and so cannot 
say that organisms actually are systems. Kant defined a system as a bounded set of self 
organizing, interacting parts which produce both themselves and an emergent whole. He argued 
that the self organizing interaction of the parts constitutes a developmental process in which a 
mature form of the system is unfolded. What is being unfolded, however, is already enfolded in 
the system. For example, an acorn already enfolds the mature form of the oak tree which is 
unfolded in its development from sapling to mature oak tree. This development occurs through 
the interaction of the parts (roots, trunk, branches, leaves), to produce both the whole system (oak 
tree) and the parts themselves, where the whole is more than the sum of the parts. In developing 
the model of a system, Kant was putting forward a concept of causality, which we might call 
formative cause, in which the parts of a system interact to form that system which then affects 
them. A system might, in turn, interact with other systems, as a part, to produce a supra system. 
Systems models, then, posit hierarchies, or levels, of system. Since these system models are 
unfolding what is already enfolded, they have no internal capacity for producing novelty and so 
cannot evolve. It is important to note that Kant argued against thinking of human action in terms 
of either mechanism or of system since both effectively deny the choice upon which individual 
autonomy depends. Clearly, if one’s actions have a deterministic ‘if-then’ cause there is no 
choice available. This is true too if a human is thought of as a part of a system because a part only 
has meaning, as a part, if it fulfils the functioning of the system, not its own ends as an 
autonomous unit.  
 
However, Kant’s strictures have been widely ignored and the notions of efficient and formative 
causality found in the natural sciences have been imported into the human sciences, initially 
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anyway, forgetting the ‘as if’ nature of the system construct. This importation became evident 
during 1930s and 1940s, as a number of scholars worked in related areas, very much in 
conversation with each other, culminating in the publication of some important publications 
around 1950 (for example, von Bertalanffy 1968; Wiener, 1948; Ashby, 1952, 1956; Forrester, 
1958). The related areas covered systems of control, the development of computer language, the 
development of a new science of mind in reaction to behaviorism, namely, cognitivism 
(McCulloch & Pitts, 1943), and the formulation of the sender-receiver model of human 
communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). This systems movement has come to form the 
foundation of today’s dominant discourse on sociology, psychology and organizational theory, so 
importing what is essentially the engineer’s notion of control into understanding human activity. 
The individual mind came to be understood as a rational, autonomous system inside a person 
which processed information to form mental models and maps, while collectivities of such 
individuals came to be understood as social systems. 
 
We can see then that the fundamental assumptions underlying the today’s dominant discourse on 
management and organizations were already clearly in place over two hundred years ago, how 
they were powerfully expressed in the importation of systemic thinking about human action in 
the middle of the last century, and how thoroughly modernist they are. Management is about 
rationally designing and controlling organizations and this involves identifying the efficient and 
systemic causes of change in organizations to yield the predictions required for leaders and 
managers, as rational, autonomous individuals, to be ‘in control’.   
 
 
Interdependent people 
 
However, even two hundred years ago this particular version of modernism was challenged, 
notably by the German philosopher, Hegel (1807). For him, modes of consciousness, ways of 
life, were constituted in social activities.  For Hegel, the individual was a cultural being, 
necessarily dependent on others, who only develops a mind and purposes of his own in 
interaction with others. Hegel argued that society, culture and thus modes of thought and 
consciousness, all evolved in conflictual interactions between people. Hegel greatly emphasized 
the social processes of recognition, arguing that a sense of self arose in social processes of mutual 
recognition. An individual can only recognize him or herself, as a self, in the recognition of those 
he or she recognizes. In this way of thinking, therefore, we move away from the modern notion 
of self as the autonomous individual to a notion of interdependent people whose individual selves 
are constituted in their interaction with each other. From this perspective, individual change 
cannot be separated from change in the groups to which an individual belongs and vice versa. 
This way of thinking also indicates a different theory of causality, an essentially paradoxical or 
dialectical theory, in which change or evolution in individual and social interaction, as continuity 
and transformation at the same time, is caused by that very interaction itself. Interacting 
individuals are forming the patterns of their interaction, the social, while at the same time they 
are being formed as individuals by their patterns of interaction. 
 
Over a century later, the process sociologist, Elias (1991, p62), acknowledged the influence of 
Hegel in emphasizing the essential interdependence of people. He described the evolution of 
Western civilization in the following terms: 
 
The network of human activities tends to become increasingly complex, far-flung 
and closely knit. More and more groups, and with them more and more 
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individuals, tend to become dependent on each other for their security and for the 
satisfaction of their needs in ways which, for the greater part, surpass the 
comprehension of those involved. It is as if first thousands, then millions, then 
more and more millions walked through this world with their hands and feet 
chained by invisible ties. No one is in charge. No one stands outside. … No one 
can regulate the movement of the whole unless a great part of them are able to 
understand, to see, as it were, the whole patterns they form together. And they are 
not able to visualize themselves as part of larger patterns because, being hemmed 
in and moved uncomprehendingly hither and thither in ways which none of them 
intended, they cannot help being preoccupied with the urgent, narrow and 
parochial problems which each of them has to face. …. Thus what is formed of 
nothing but human beings acts upon each of them, and is experienced by many as 
an alien external force not unlike the forces of nature. (Elias, 1978, p9) 
 
He argued that what we now call Western civilization is not the result of any kind of calculated 
long-term planning. Individual people did not form an intention to change civilization and then 
gradually realize this intention through rational, purposive measures. It is not conceivable that the 
evolution of society could be planned because that would suppose that “modern” rational, 
calculating individuals with a degree of self-mastery already existed centuries ago, whereas such 
individuals did not exist then but were, rather, themselves the products of social evolution. Elias 
argued that the change in society occurred in an unplanned manner but nevertheless displayed a 
specific type of order.  
 
It is simple enough: plans and actions, the emotional and rational impulses of 
individual people, constantly interweave in a friendly or hostile way. This basic 
tissue resulting from many single plans and actions of men can give rise to 
changes and patterns that no individual person has planned or created. From this 
interdependence of people arise an order sui generis, an order more compelling 
and stronger than the will and reason of the individual people composing it. It is 
the order of interweaving human impulses and strivings, the social order, which 
determines the course of historical change; it underlies the civilizing process. 
(Elias, 2000/1939, p366)  
 
Though it is unplanned and not immediately controllable, the overall process of 
development of a society is not in the least incomprehensible. There are no 
‘mysterious’ social forces behind it. It is a question of the consequences flowing 
from the intermeshing of the actions of numerous people …. As the moves of 
interdependent players intertwine, no single player nor any group of players acting 
alone can determine the course of the game no matter how powerful they may be. 
.... It involves a partly self-regulating change in a partly self-organizing and self-
reproducing figuration of interdependent people, whole processes tending in a 
certain direction. (Elias, 1991 p146-147)  
 
 
Although it is highly unlikely that Elias was ever aware of the complexity sciences, what he is 
describing here is what modern natural complexity scientists call self-organisation and emergence 
(for example, Prigogine, 1997; Kauffman, 1995; Goodwin, 1994). Elias is arguing that 
individuals and groups are interacting with each other, in their local situations, in intentional, 
planned ways. However, the widespread, global consequences of the intermeshing of these 
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intentions and plans cannot be foreseen by any of them – long term global consequences emerge. 
Elias goes on to explain why long-term consequences cannot be foreseen. 
 
The interplay of the actions, purposes and plans of many people is not itself 
something intended or planned, and is ultimately immune to planning. …. the 
autonomy of what a person calls “we” is more powerful than the plans and 
purposes of an individual “I”. (Elias, 1991, p62) 
 
Here Elias is pointing to the important fact that individuals pursuing their plans are always in 
relationship with each other in a group or power figuration. While individuals can plan their own 
actions, they cannot plan the actions of others and so cannot plan the interplay of plans and 
actions. The fact that each person depends on others means that none can simply realize their 
plans. However, this does not mean that anarchy, or disorder, results. Elias talks about a trend or 
direction in the evolution of the consequences of the interplay of individual plans and intentions. 
In other words, he is talking about self-organization and emergence and this immediately 
suggests to me the potential for greater insight into the process that may be found in the 
complexity sciences, which are concerned with the same kind of process. 
 
What Elias is saying departs very clearly from the assumptions underlying the dominant of 
discourse on management and organizations today. It emphasizes “we” rather than “I”, or 
individual agency, and points to the difficulty we have in thinking about interdependence. It is far 
easier to think in the apparently rational mode of the modern dominant discourse. But is this 
thinking as rational as we assume? Consider what Elias has to say about our modes of thinking. 
 
 
Modes of thought 
 
In his essay on involvement and detachment, Elias (1987) distinguishes between two modes of 
thinking.  As an example of the first mode, which he refers to as involved thinking, he describes 
the way people in the West thought about nature in the pre-scientific age.  People experienced 
nature as rather mysterious forces acting upon them, often with great violence, which they found 
very difficult to understand, let alone control.  When people find themselves in such situations 
they become anxious and this arouses high levels of emotion, creating a vicious circle in which it 
becomes harder and harder to formulate explanations of what is happening to them. They become 
deeply involved in the experience finding it harder and harder to stand back and reflect in a 
‘reality congruent’ fashion. The anxiety is dealt with, to some extent, by developing what Elias 
calls ‘magico-mythic’ explanations according to which nature is understood either in terms of 
impersonal forces acting upon them in a way that they cannot control or as personalized gods and 
spirits also beyond human control.  Such explanations call forth responses of acceptance, 
submission and conformity. 
 
The second mode of thinking, which Elias calls detached thinking, is exemplified by the 
scientific method.  By overcoming fear of the unknown, the scientific method enables people to 
stand back and reflect on nature in a way that is more ‘reality congruent’. By taking the position 
of the objective observer, they feel less involved in their experiences with nature, less emotional 
and more rational. The result is a virtuous circle in which levels of anxiety diminish so enabling a 
more detached attitude leading to greater control over nature and so even further decline in levels 
of anxiety. 
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Even in relation to nature, Elias argues that humans never display pure forms of either detached 
or involved thinking.  Thinking is thus always paradoxically involved and detached at the same 
time; thinking rationally always also involves emotion at the same time. However, the paradox of 
involvement and detachment is transformed as ways of thinking that differ from one situation to 
another. In some situations, the aspect of involvement is more apparent while in other it is the 
aspect of detachment that is more apparent.  This leads then to how we might characterize 
thinking in the social sciences. Here, Elias argues that it is much harder to think in ways that are 
more detached because in the social sciences the phenomena we are concerned with are 
ourselves. Elias appeals to us to face up to the fact that we do not have ‘reality congruent’ ways 
of thinking about social phenomena such as organizations. He ascribes this to a basic fact to be 
found in all human experience namely that we depend upon each other. None of us can survive 
on or own, indeed, there is hardly anything that any of us can do on our own. What each of us 
does affects others and what they do affects each of us. We inevitable both constrain and enable 
each other. So, each of us is continually forming intentions and making choices of our next action 
but because we are interdependent none of us can control the consequences of what we do. The 
consequences emerge in the interplay of all out intentions and those consequences prompt further 
action on the part of all of us, the consequences of which will also emerge, and so on in a process 
that has no beginning or end. 
 
This experience of the social nowadays is thus similar to the experience people long ago had in 
their encounter with nature and the same kind of anxiety is therefore aroused.  This makes it very 
difficult to adopt detached thinking and so the paradox of detached involvement tends to be 
transformed as ‘magico-mythic’ thinking.  People come to talk about social forces acting on them 
and organizations as ‘thing’ that exists outside their interaction. As an example of this ‘magic-
mythic’ thinking, Elias refers to the way in which social scientists talk about societies, 
institutions and organizations as ‘wholes’ or ‘systems’, which he says is the creation of a mystery 
in order to solve a mystery. What he calls for to generate an alternative, more detached mode of 
thought, is a focus on the actual processes of our interdependence. 
 
It seems to me that mainstream organizational and management literature, the Business Schools 
and the management and leadership development programs of major organizations are all, for the 
most part, promoting what Elias has called magico-mythic thinking. However, the magico-mythic 
nature of our explanations of organizational life is covered over by the rational sounding 
language in which they are presented. They promote the illusion of control so providing social 
defenses against anxiety but in the process distancing us from our actual experience and making 
rationally invisible what we actually do in organizations. It seems to me that a great many of the 
explanations of, and prescriptions for, acting in organizations today amount to the construction of 
a fantasy world so that we can preserve the illusion that some one is in control.  
 
 
What is practical? 
 
Managers are always calling for practical ‘tools’ and techniques so that they can achieve success. 
What they accept as ‘tools’ is usually a list of actions or behaviors, for example, the seven habits 
of effective people, and the ubiquitous two by two matrix. For example, such a tool could take 
the form of a diagram with some variable said to cause the organization’s culture, say, X, 
measured on the vertical axis and another cause, say, Y, on the horizontal axis. Four possible 
ways of combining these variables are depicted to yield four different categories of culture. 
Managers are then supposed to answer a questionnaire to locate their organization’s culture and 
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then decide whether they need to move to a better culture and if they do to make the move by 
operating on variables X and Y. I find it astonishing that anyone believes that this is remotely 
possible, let alone practical. What is happening when people talk like this is a taken-for-granted 
process of reifying the organization. It feels natural to think that the organization actually exists 
as a thing which can be moved around. Not only do people tend to reify organizations, they quite 
easily slip into anthropomorphizing them. Not only is the organization a thing, it is also a kind of 
person with a purpose and a direction of its own, both of which can be chosen by its most 
powerful members. It is now not uncommon for people to talk about an organization as a living 
thing, a living system just like the systems in nature. It is then a short step to call for a return to 
ancient wisdom when thinking about organizations so as to find a simpler way more connected to 
nature. Calls are made for the re-sacralization of nature and of work. Leaders are called upon to 
form inspiring visions and convert others to them. All should follow a mission. What we see here 
is a progressive move to highly involved, magico-mythical thinking about organizations, highly 
reminiscent of how people used to think about nature. What is striking in the dominant 
management discourse is the absence of ordinary people as organizations are understood as 
positions in markets, bundles of resources, abstract cultures and charismatic, leaders with 
extraordinary powers of envisioning. 
 
What I think is required to move away from this magico-mythical thinking, dressed up in rational 
sounding jargon, is an approach to thinking about our lives in organizations in a way that 
involves taking our ordinary, everyday experience seriously. Taking seriously one’s experience 
of what one is actually doing in local interactions with others, taking seriously our 
interdependence, leads to very different views of what is practical. Taking this route we come to 
see that there are no mysterious social forces acting upon us, no abstract cultures that visionary 
leaders can move around at will. Instead we see how we are taking up global patterns in our local 
interactions, so reproducing and potentially transforming those global patterns. This call to focus 
on experience should not be mistaken for some utopian ideal for a ‘return’ to some primal 
harmony. By experience I mean the actual experience of interaction in which we express hatred, 
aggression, greed as well as love, compassion and care. 
 
This is what colleagues and I are trying to do in developing a perspective on organizations which 
we call complex responsive processes of relating (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000; Stacey, 2001; 
Griffin, 2001; Streatfield 2001; Fonseca, 2001; Shaw, 2002). 
  
 
The perspective of complex responsive processes 
 
From the perspective of complex responsive processes, organizations are thought of as patterns of 
interaction between people that are iterated in each present. Instead of abstracting from the 
experience of human bodily interaction, which is what we do when we posit that individuals 
create a system in their interaction, the perspective of complex responsive processes stays with 
the experience of interaction which produces nothing but further interaction. In other words, one 
moves from thinking in terms of a spatial metaphor, to a temporal processes way of thinking, 
where the temporal processes are those of human relating. Organizations are then understood as 
processes of human relating and it is in the simultaneously cooperative-consensual and 
conflictual-competitive relating between people that they perpetually construct their future 
together in the present. Complex responsive processes of relating can be understood as acts of 
communication, relations of power, and the interplay between peoples’ choices arising in acts of 
evaluation. 
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It is because human agents are conscious and self-conscious that they are able to cooperate and 
reach consensus, while at the same time conflict and compete with each other, in the highly 
sophisticated ways in which they do. Drawing on the work of the American pragmatist, George 
Herbert Mead (1934), one can understand consciousness as arising in the communicative 
interaction between human bodies. Humans have evolved central nervous systems such that when 
one gestures to another, particularly in the form of vocal gesture or language, one evokes in one’s 
own body responses to one’s gesture that are similar to those evoked in other bodies. In other 
words, in their acting, humans take the attitude, the tendency to act, of the other and it is because 
they have this capacity that humans can know what they are doing. It immediately follows that 
consciousness (knowing, mind) is a social process in which meaning emerges in the social act of 
gesture-response, where the gesture can never be separated from the response. Meaning does not 
lie in the gesture, the word, alone but only in the gesture taken together with the response to it. 
Furthermore, in communicating with each other as the basis of everything they do, people do not 
simply take the attitude of the specific others with whom they are relating. Humans have the 
capacity for generalizing so that when they act they always take up the attitude of what Mead 
called the generalized other. In other words, they always take the attitude of the group or society 
to their actions – they are concerned about what others might think of what they do or say. This is 
often unconscious and it is, of course, a powerful form of social control.  Communication, then, is 
not simply the sending of a signal to be received by another, but rather complex social, that is, 
responsive, processes of self formation in which meaning and the society-wide pattern of the 
social object emerge. 
 
Drawing on the work of Elias, one understands how the processes of communicative interacting 
constitute relations of power. For Elias, power is not something anyone possesses but is rather a 
characteristic of all human relating. In order to form, and stay in, a relationship with someone 
else, one cannot do whatever one wants. As soon as we enter into relationships we constrain and 
are constrained by others and, of course, we also enable and are enabled by others. Power is this 
enabling-constraining relationship where the power balance is tilted in favor of some and against 
others depending on the relative need they have for each other. Elias showed how such power 
relationships form figurations, or groupings, in which some are included and others are excluded 
and where the power balance is tilted in favor of some groupings and against others. These 
grouping establish powerful feelings of belonging which constitute each individual’s “we” 
identity. These “we” identities, derived from the groups we belong to, are inseparable from each 
of our ‘I’ identities. As with Mead, then, we can see that processes of human relating form and 
are formed by individual and collective identities, which inevitably reflect complex patterns of 
power relating. 
 
In their communicative interacting and power relating, humans are always making choices 
between one action and another. The choices may be made on the basis of conscious desires and 
intentions, or unconscious desires and choices, for example, those that are habitual, impulsive, 
obsessive, compulsive compelling or inspiring. In other words, human action is always 
evaluative, sometimes consciously and at other times unconsciously. The criteria for evaluating 
these choices are values and norms, together constituting ideology. 
 
In describing the fundamental aspects of the complex responsive processes of human relating, I 
have referred on a number of occasions to patterns of communicative interaction and figurations 
of power relations. These patterns and figurations can be understood as themes, taking both 
propositional and narrative forms, which emerge and re-emerge in the iteration in each 
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succeeding present of the interactive processes of communication, power and evaluation. These 
themes organize the experience of being together. 
 
By analogy with complex adaptive systems (Goodwin, 1994; Kauffman, 1995; Waldrop, 1992), 
the thematic patterning of interaction is understood to be: 
 
• Complex. Complexity here refers to a particular dynamic or movement in time that is 
paradoxically stable and unstable, predictable and unpredictable, known and unknown, 
certain and uncertain, all at the same time. Complexity and uncertainty are both often 
used to refer to the situation or environment in which humans must act and this is 
distinguished from simple or certain environments. Prescriptions for effective action are 
then related to, held to be contingent upon, the type of environment. However, from the 
complex responsive processes perspective it is human relating itself which is complex 
and uncertain. 
• Self-organizing and emergent. Self-organizing means that agents interact with each other 
on the basis of their own local organizing principles, and it is in such local interaction 
that widespread, coherence emerges without any program plan or blueprint for that 
widespread pattern itself.  
• Evolving. The generalizations people take up in their interactions have to be 
particularized specific situations and that inevitably means some form of conflict. The 
generalizations will never be particularized in exactly the same way and the nonlinear 
nature of human interaction means that these small differences could be amplified into 
completely different generalizations. In this way, patterns of interaction evolve.   
 
I think this perspective creates a very different research agenda for day to day management in 
organizations which focuses on patterns of social relations and their key aspects of 
communication power and evaluative choice. Examples of such research are presented in a Series 
of books edited by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw called Complexity as the Experience of Organizing 
(Stacey & Griffin, 2005a; Griffin & Stacey, 2005; Stacey, R., 2005; Stacey & Griffin, 2006). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The dominant discourse on organizations and their management is built on a myth conveyed in 
most of the literature and perpetuated by the management speak engaged in by leaders and 
managers in organizations. The myth is that organizations can be, and most effectively are, 
managed and led predominately on the basis of instrumental rationality which produces 
organizational movement according to designs formulated before any action. It is taken-for-
granted that change can and must be designed for the whole organization and it is ultimately the 
responsibility of leaders to do this. However, there is no persuasive evidence that organizations 
do change, succeed and fail because of the designs prepared and enunciated by their leaders or 
anyone else. Most studies point to how often the grand design has no effects or is simply 
disruptive. Despite this lack of evidence, the myth continues and has now been imported 
wholesale into modes of public sector governance. Dominant ways of thinking are not fit for 
purpose and cover over how things actually get done. In our experience, change emerges in 
predominantly unpredictable ways. Such unpredictable changes in global patterns of interaction 
emerge in myriad local interactions. It is impossible to design the whole or changes in it. What 
becomes important from this perspective is the ongoing, ordinary everyday local interactions, 
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particularly the communicative interacting of ordinary conversation in which power relations are 
formed and are sustain by ideology or changed. The role of leader is to participate actively in 
local interactions to widen and deepen communication. Many however prefer the myth of the 
hero who can change the whole to the ordinary activity of real leaders who work with others to 
co-create the perpetually constructed future of an organization. 
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